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Coding and computer-use agents
Agents with a shell, a browser or a repository, and the boundaries that keep production out of reach.
- Pieces
- 57
- Threat research
- 16
- Updated
- Oct 20, 2026
4 pieces · newest first
Threat research9 min read
Rules files and self-approval: how coding assistants get reconfigured by the code they read
Instruction files that coding assistants load every session are a persistent injection channel, and an agent that can edit its own settings can switch off its own approvals. A teardown of the Rules File Backdoor and CVE-2025-53773, and the paths to protect.
Intertrace Threat Research
Threat research9 min read
Slopsquatting: the install is the attack, not the hallucination
Code-generating models invent package names and repeat many of them, and coding agents install what they invent. What the research measured, why better models and code review are not controls, and the registry and gateway checks that break the chain.
Intertrace Threat Research
Guide10 min read
Coding agents need broad access. Production should not be part of it.
A coding agent inherits every credential your shell can reach, so a session that starts with a failing test can end at the production database. Seven controls that keep production out of reach, why each matters, and the test that proves it.
Intertrace
Technical paper10 min read
Securing agents that click: computer-use and browser agents
A hotel receipt tells an expense-filing browser agent to change the reimbursement bank account. A step-by-step teardown of how that works, then the controls that hold even when the injection lands: isolation, allowlists, gated clicks, credential handling, redaction and takeover.
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